



# UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
United States Patent and Trademark Office  
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS  
P.O. Box 1450  
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450  
[www.uspto.gov](http://www.uspto.gov)

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/805,522	03/13/2001	Douglas Monticciolo	198191/0004	1852
7590 04/03/2008 STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP 180 Maiden Lane New York, NY 10038			EXAMINER SUBRAMANIAN, NARAYANSWAMY	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			3691	
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			04/03/2008	PAPER

**Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.**

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

### Office Action Summary

**Application No.**

09/805,522

**Applicant(s)**

MONTICCIOLLO, DOUGLAS

**Examiner**

Narayanswamy Subramanian

**Art Unit**

3691

**-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --**  
**Period for Reply**

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

**Status**

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 11 January 2008.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

**Disposition of Claims**

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-3 and 5-8 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-3 and 5-8 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

**Application Papers**

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
- Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
- Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

**Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119**

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
  2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
  3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

\* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

**Attachment(s)**

- 1) ☐ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SF/88)
- Paper No(s)/Mail Date \_\_\_\_\_
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
- Paper No(s)/Mail Date \_\_\_\_\_
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application
- 6) ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_

### DETAILED ACTION

1. This office action is in response to applicants' communication filed on January 11, 2008. Cancellation of withdrawn claims 21-26 has been entered. Claims 1-3 and 5-8 are currently pending and have been examined. The rejections and response to arguments are stated below.

#### *Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101*

2. 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

3. Claims 1-3 and 5-8 are rejected because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter.

35 USC 101 requires that in order to be patentable the invention must be a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof" (emphasis added). It is not clear as to which statutory class the claimed invention belongs.

The claimed invention does not fall in the process category for the following reason. Quoting from *In re Comiskey* (No. 06-1286, Federal Circuit) "The Supreme Court has recognized only two instances in which such a method may qualify as a section 101 process: when the process 'either [1] was tied to a particular apparatus or [2] operated to change materials to a 'different state or thing.'" In *Diehr*, the Supreme Court confirmed that a process claim reciting an algorithm could state statutory subject matter if it: (1) is tied to a machine or (2) creates or involves a composition of matter or manufacture.<sup>12</sup> 450 U.S. at 184. There, in the context of a process claim for curing rubber that recited an algorithm, the Court concluded that "[t]ransformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the

patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.” Id. (quoting *Benson*, 409 U.S. at 70);<sup>13</sup> see also *In re Schrader*, 22 F.3d 290, 295 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding when a claim does not invoke a machine, “§ 101 requires some kind of transformation or reduction of subject matter”). Thus, a claim that involves both a mental process and one of the other categories of statutory subject matter (i.e., a machine, manufacture, or composition) may be patentable under § 101. However, mental processes—or processes of human thinking—standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical application. The Supreme Court has stated that “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” *Benson*, 409 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added). In *Flook* the patentee argued that his claims did not seek to patent an abstract idea (an algorithm) because they were limited to a practical application of that idea—updating “alarm limits” for catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. 437 U.S. at 586, 589-90. The Court rejected the notion that mere recitation of a practical application of an abstract idea makes it patentable, concluding that “[a] competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula.” Id. at 590. Since all other features of the process were well-known, including “the use of computers for ‘automatic monitoring-alarming,’” the Court construed the application as “simply provid[ing] a new and presumably better method for calculating alarm limit values.” Id. at 594-95. The 14 See *AT&T*, 172 F.3d at 1355, 1358 (holding patentable “a process that uses the Boolean principle in order to determine the value of the PIC indicator” and that “require[d] the use of switches and computers”); *State Street Bank*, 149 F.3d at 1373 (“[W]e hold that the transformation of data . . . by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a

practical application of a mathematical algorithm.” (emphases added)); *Alappat*, 33 F.3d at 1544 (“This is not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.” (emphases added)); *Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.*, 958 F.2d 1053, 1058-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding patentable a method for analyzing electrocardiograph signals for the detection of a specific heart condition that used “electronic equipment programmed to perform mathematical computation”). Court held the application unpatentable because “if a claim [as a whole] is directed essentially to a method of calculating, using a mathematical formula, even if the solution is for a specific purpose, the claimed method is nonstatutory.” 437 U.S. at 595 (quoting *In re Richman*, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (CCPA 1977)). Following the lead of the Supreme Court, this court and our predecessor court have refused to find processes patentable when they merely claimed a mental process standing alone and untied to another category of statutory subject matter even when a practical application was claimed. In *Schrader* we held unpatentable a “method constituting a novel way of conducting auctions” by allowing competitive bidding on a plurality of related items. 22 F.3d at 291. In doing so, we rejected the patentee’s argument that the process used a machine. Two of the alleged machines—a “display” in the front of the auction room and “a closed-circuit television system” for bidders in different cities—were not claimed by the patent, and the third—a “record” in which bids could be entered—could be “a piece of paper or a chalkboard.” *Id.* at 293-94. We therefore concluded that the patent impermissibly claimed unpatentable subject matter. Similarly, in *In re Warmerdam*, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994), we held unpatentable a process for controlling objects so as to avoid collisions because the key steps of “locating a medial axis” and “creating a bubble hierarchy” described “nothing

more than the manipulation of basic mathematical constructs, the paradigmatic ‘abstract idea.’” Id. at 1360. A machine was not required, id. at 1358, nor was there any indication that the process operated on a manufacture or composition of matter. Decisions of our predecessor court are in accord. *In re Meyer*, 688 F.2d 789, 796 (CCPA 1982), held that “a mental process that a neurologist should follow” was not patentable because it was “not limited to any otherwise statutory process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” Id. at 795. Similarly, *In re Maucorps*, 609 F.2d 481 (CCPA 1979), held that an invention “ultimately . . . directed toward optimizing the organization of sales representatives in a business” was unpatentable. Id. at 482, 486. See also *Alappat*, 33 F.3d at 1541 (“*Maucorps* dealt with a business method for deciding how salesmen should best handle respective customers and *Meyer* involved a ‘system’ for aiding a neurologist in diagnosing patients. Clearly, neither of the alleged ‘inventions’ in those cases falls within any § 101 category.”). The steps of the method are untied to another category of statutory subject matter and hence the claimed invention does not qualify as a process under 35 U.S.C 101.

#### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112***

4. The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

5. Claims 1-3 and 5-8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

Claim 1 recites “transferring risk of loss other than the first loss”. This limitation lacks antecedent basis because “risk of loss other than the first loss” has not been defined in the

preamble or a preceding step. Also the limitation “the entity having a second rating greater than the first rating or no rating” is not clear. It is not clear if the second rating is greater than the first rating or if the second rating is greater than no rating. This claim also recites “the lending institution receiving proceeds”. It is not clear if the proceeds received are the same as the proceeds in an amount greater than that which the lending institution could secure due to the second rating being greater than the first rating or no rating. Similarly this claim also recites “the lending institution funding loans using the proceeds”. It is not clear if the loans being funded are the same loans that were transferred. Appropriate correction/clarification is required. Dependent claims are rejected by way of dependency on a rejected independent claim.

#### ***Response to Arguments***

6. Applicant's arguments with respect to pending claims have been considered but are moot in view of new grounds of rejection.

#### ***Conclusion***

7. Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event,

however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Dr. Narayanswamy Subramanian whose telephone number is (571) 272-6751. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Thursday from 8:30 AM to 7:00 PM. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Alexander Kalinowski can be reached at (571) 272-6771. The fax number for Formal or Official faxes and Draft to the Patent Office is (571) 273-8300.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PMR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PMR only. For more information about the PMR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

/Narayanswamy Subramanian/  
Primary Examiner  
Art Unit 3691

March 30, 2008